

Leader Actions to Enhance Soldier Resiliency in Combat

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ABSTRACT

Combat places extraordinary demands on every individual, particularly the junior leader. The cumulative demands of combat may affect the leader's ability to lead his or her unit, resulting in members of their unit being tempted to quit. However, there are actions that leaders can take to build resiliency in their Soldiers, enabling them to lead their subordinates through the stressors of combat. Within the framework of social psychological contract theory, we outline two general approaches to leadership, the rigid institutional approach and the flexible pragmatic approach. The rigid institutional leader is characterized by (a) performing only those leader actions mandated by directives (such as policies and regulations), (b) demanding that subordinates show them respect based on their position within the organization and (c) forbidding any form of criticism from their subordinates. In contrast, the flexible pragmatic leader is characterized by (a) engaging in actions that are not mandated by policies or directives, such as giving Soldiers time off following high periods of workload, (b) expecting respect shown to them by their subordinates to be based on both their position within the organization and the soundness of their decisions, and (c) encouraging their subordinates to criticize their policies and decisions with the aim to improve unit functioning. Next, based on surveys and focus groups with Soldiers in a combat environment or with Soldiers recently returned from combat, we identify those leader actions that serve to build Soldier resiliency, focusing on both behaviors that leaders should and should not engage in.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Combat makes extraordinary demands on every individual, particularly the junior leader. Many of the significant stresses placed upon individuals in combat are unknown in garrison and civilian life. The cumulative demand of combat may affect the leader's ability to lead his or her unit, and has the potential to

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ultimately tempt military personnel to quit. This temptation would be almost irresistible if the mental fortitude of the individuals had not been tempered to the ordeal (see Stouffer, Lumsdaine, Lumsdaine, Williams, Smith, Janis, Star & Cottrell, 1949). Similarly, the junior leader must be tempered to the ordeal of command, both in peacetime and in war. The behavior of the junior commissioned and non-commissioned officers in combat is critical to the survival, performance and morale of the unit. One way in which the morale and well-being of the unit can be improved or enhanced is through thoughtful and flexible leadership, whether in combat or in garrison (see Britt & Dickinson, Volume 1).

Regardless of the research orientation taken in investigating leadership and its helpful and unhelpful effects on soldier morale and well-being, measuring leadership by focusing on specific, observable behaviors simultaneously sets the groundwork for potential leadership training and intervention approaches. These behaviors do not necessarily have to be extraordinary, and indeed, often they are not. It is the every day behaviors the junior leaders perform that enable their combat teams to carry on in the face of the ever present dangers of war. Despite the importance of junior leaders to units during combat, there have been very few studies focused on the junior leader. The few studies that have been conducted have focused on junior officers (i.e., lieutenants and captains), with most of our knowledge concerning leader behaviors in combat coming from war memoirs (see Fussell, 1989; MacDonald, 1947; McDonough, 1985; and see Sledge, 1981 to obtain the perspective of a junior enlisted soldier during World War II). Wong's study of junior officers in combat marks one of the few scientific departures from this model, although even this approach was more qualitative in nature.

The leader behaviors we discuss in this chapter should not be viewed as representing a new angle on leadership but rather a "greatest hits compilation" of what junior leaders need to be, know, and do to lead their subordinates successfully through the stress of combat. To this end, we present research findings collected from soldiers serving or who have served in combat or peacekeeping deployments, highlighting those behaviors that junior leaders perform that contribute to the health and well-being of deployed soldiers. We begin our discussion by distinguishing between two general approaches to leadership: the rigid institutional approach and the flexible pragmatic approach, demonstrating how those leaders who view the leader role as part of a responsive, flexible, open system tend to naturally engage in leadership behaviors and actions advocated by the U.S. Army (Department of Army, 1990, 1999). Next, we discuss the theory of the social contract, illustrating how leader behaviors can either strengthen or weaken the relationship between the leader and subordinates and thereby dramatically influence unit effectiveness. Following an analysis of how social contract theory drives the fundamental approach of the two contrasting leadership types, a discussion of the cultural aspect of leader behaviors is presented. We then present two lists of behaviors. The first list contains those behaviors and actions that junior leaders *should* employ in leading their subordinates in combat, while the second list includes those actions and behaviors that junior leaders *should not* engage in. The chapter concludes with a discussion of proposals for future research in the area of junior leader development.

2.0 THE FLEXIBLE PRAGMATIC AND RIGID INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP

While the flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional approaches to leadership differ in terms of attitudes and behaviors, there are fundamentals of military leadership to which both approaches subscribe. First, both the flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional approaches to leadership believe in the primacy of the mission. Both types of leaders recognize that military life is hard and that personal sacrifices are often necessary in order to accomplish the mission. In times of war, both flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional leaders acknowledge that one of these sacrifices might involve giving up one's life. This fact of military life transcends leadership style.

Second, both leadership approaches assume that controls need to be placed on the behavior of subordinates. That is, rules and regulations are acceptable and necessary in order for the organization to function. Without such structures, it is not certain if individuals would conform to the dictates of reason and justice. Americans in particular are imbued with a strong belief in the virtues of rugged individualism and the right to engage in any activity so long as it does no harm to others or society. Both flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional leaders believe that regulations and policies are essential for prescribing behavioral conduct. In addition, flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional leaders accept as necessary the requirement for every recruit to undergo a period of indoctrination in order to instill discipline and group cooperation among military personnel (see McGurk, Cotting, Britt, & Adler, this volume).

Finally, both the flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional perspectives on leadership believe in the virtues of the military chain-of-command as the decision-making authority, subject to overall civilian control. When problems or issues arise, both flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional leaders expect the decision to be made by someone within the chain-of-command. Thus, actions or decisions made outside of or contrary to the directives of the chain-of-command are viewed as one of the most serious of offenses and deserving of severe punishment.

Despite the importance of the similarities between the flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional approaches to leadership, these two views differ in three important aspects. First, flexible pragmatic leaders believe in a system of mutual obligation. They believe there exist between the leader and the subordinate unbreakable obligations; and although not legally binding, flexible pragmatic leaders believe they are duty-bound to uphold these obligations. In fact, flexible pragmatic leaders would consider it a failure in leadership not to adhere to these obligations. From the perspective of the subordinate, these non-binding obligations are ones they expect their leaders to fulfill. In contrast, rigid institutional leaders feel no obligation to perform functions other than the ones they are specifically directed to perform. For the rigid institutional leader, the carrying out of these unwritten responsibilities or meeting subordinate expectations is not part of the essential construct of leadership and is viewed as simply optional. If the rigid institutional leader does fulfill these non-binding, optional obligations, then the rigid institutional leader expects the subordinate to be grateful. However, flexible pragmatic leaders expect no gratitude from their subordinates when they discharge a non-binding obligation because, from their perspective, they were only following through on a commitment inherent to the assigned position.

The second significant difference between flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional perspectives on leadership is how leaders acquire and maintain power and authority. While flexible pragmatic leaders hold that their power and authority derives from both their leadership position and the content of their decisions, rigid institutional leaders believe that their power and authority are based solely on their position as a leader. For flexible pragmatic leaders, the respect that subordinates show them is a direct reflection of the validity of their decisions irrespective of their position in the organization; that is, respect from subordinates is earned by the leader not awarded from superiors. Flexible pragmatic leaders, in fact, view their position in the organization as a means toward the end, rather than the end itself. Rigid institutional leaders, on the other hand, believe that subordinates should respect them because they are the leaders. For the rigid institutional leader, respect is not earned from subordinates but from superiors who appointed them to their current leader position. Rigid institutional leaders believe they are entitled to be respected by subordinates.

The final important difference between flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional views on leadership concerns criticism. Flexible pragmatic leaders permit and encourage criticism from their subordinates while rigid institutional leaders forbid any criticism of their policies or decisions and consider such criticism a type of insubordination. From the flexible pragmatic leader's perspective, to deny subordinates an opportunity to

criticize their leaders denies leaders an opportunity to gain knowledge of matters and issues, which, if they knew about, they would rectify themselves. Permitting criticism aids the flexible pragmatic leader in (a) avoiding inconsistent or contradictory rules and policies; (b) nipping potential crises in the bud; and (c) allowing leaders the opportunity to remedy their own blunders or mistakes. Without positive and negative input from subordinates, leaders put themselves in a stultifying position in which they inevitably appear inconsistent, ridiculous or, worse, incompetent. By allowing criticism, leaders become fact minded and critical of themselves, which tends to prevent them from engaging in what amounts to unit- or self-destructive behaviors. Such openness to feedback from subordinates ensures that decisions are made in the interests of all concerned, the subordinates', the unit's, and the military's.

In summary, flexible pragmatic leadership is an approach that affects the attitude and the behaviors of the leaders. We label this style “flexible pragmatic” because the leader views the unit, whether a platoon, company or other military group, as an organism that changes as a result of forces from below as well as from above and that strives to reach homeostasis, a stable adaptation to demands. The system respects structure and hierarchy and yet is elastic in structure when it comes to accepting feedback from subordinates. The flexible pragmatic military system is not an unstructured system but one in which the mission is paramount, rules and hierarchy are fundamental, and unit relationships are built with input informed by experience. The flexible pragmatic leader, as the head of this relatively flexible pragmatic system, sees the intertwined obligations between leader and subordinate as bi-directional, rather than exclusively top-down driven. The respect accorded the flexible pragmatic leader is not considered to occur in a vacuum, as only a function of assigned position, but one that emerges from a series of interactions. These sets of beliefs undoubtedly influence behavior of the leaders, the response of subordinates, and may well in fact affect job performance.

3.0 THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT

One critical aspect of effective leadership—whether using a flexible pragmatic or rigid institutional style—is the degree of trust and respect that leaders instill in their subordinates. At the very center of earning and keeping subordinate trust and respect is the explicit and implicit “contract” of expectations agreed upon between leader and follower. A constructive psychological contract is a set of shared obligations and expectations that exist between employers and employees in regards to their working relationships (Dabos & Rousseau, 2004; Rousseau, 1989; 2000; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999). From a military standpoint, psychological contracts consist of promises and commitments that leaders and subordinates make to each other. Importantly, psychological contracts are present in every leader-subordinate relationship, whether they are desired or not. In other words, psychological contracts are obligatory, not voluntary. It is this fact that makes the style of leadership adopted so important in the development of leader-subordinate bonds.

The value of a psychological contract lies in leaders and subordinates agreeing on the terms of the contract. When there is agreement between leaders and subordinates on the interpretation of the promises and commitments, future interactions become more predictable, resulting in effective planning, coordination and execution (cf., Dabos & Rousseau, 2004). It is important to appreciate that it is only when the level of agreement between the leader and subordinate (i.e., mutuality) is high that the benefits of a psychological contract are realized. When agreement, or mutuality, is low, that is, when there is a lack of agreement between leaders and subordinates in the meaning of promises and obligations, current and future exchanges between the leaders and subordinates become strained, culminating in subordinates distrusting and lacking confidence in their leaders.

For example, when soldiers join the U.S. Army they give up certain rights, including control over their work and personal time. Indeed, it is not uncommon for soldiers to be required to work 60-70 hours per week.

Soldiers do not receive direct monetary compensation for these additional hours. In exchange, soldiers expect their leaders to ensure that the soldiers' time is not wasted due to poor planning, coordination, or some other inefficiency that could have been prevented. Further, given that they will not be receiving payment for the additional work hours, soldiers expect their leaders to recognize and reward them through some other mechanism, typically by giving them additional time off at some future point.

The response of leaders in this case will depend on whether they adopt a flexible pragmatic or rigid institutional viewpoint. While both the flexible pragmatic and rigid institutional leaders will demand that their subordinates work the additional hours until the mission is accomplished, flexible pragmatic leaders will feel obligated to reward the soldiers for imposing this extra demand, even if the requirement was initiated by higher ups. That is, even though the soldiers were required to work the additional hours, flexible pragmatic leaders will respond to their subordinates' performance as representing a personal commitment on their part to ensuring that the mission is accomplished, and deserving of recognition. By recognizing their subordinates in this manner, flexible pragmatic leaders ensure that the level of agreement or mutuality remains high (see Britt, Davison, Bliese & Castro, 2004).

In contrast, rigid institutional leaders will feel no obligation to compensate their subordinates for the extra hours worked because there is no legally binding requirement for them to do so. In fact, rigid institutional leaders might respond by telling their subordinates that if they wanted a 40 hour a week job that they should not have joined the military. And when these rigid institutional leaders do compensate their subordinates for working the unusually long hours by giving them extra time off from work, they are surprised when their subordinates do not respond towards them in an appreciative and enthusiastic manner. The reason for this reaction is simple, the subordinates view the added time off as just compensation for their hard work, not something extra that their rigid institutional leaders have done for them. Thus, the rigid institutional leaders' response in this situation serves to decrease the mutuality of the psychological construct, resulting in strained relationships between the leaders and the subordinates.

As can be seen from the example above, there are inherent dangers associated with the presence of psychological contracts. First, psychological contracts involve expectations of binding promises between leaders and/or subordinates in which there might not be agreement. The consequences of this lack of agreement are strained leader-subordinate relations, resulting in lower morale, cohesion, and retention, which tend to degrade unit performance. Another danger of psychological contracts is that neither the promises nor the expectations are written down or always clearly communicated. Instead, these promises and expectations are assumed to exist based on individual values, motives, and cultural norms (Rousseau, 1995). Finally, even when there is agreement regarding promises and commitments, these promises can be unilaterally broken by either the leaders or the subordinates. Since promises create prima facie obligations to fulfill them, broken promises naturally lead to resentment and lack of trust. However, our contention is that leaders who adapt a flexible pragmatic approach not only will engage in behaviors that build constructive leader-subordinate relationships, but also will engage in behaviors that serve to help them avoid these pitfalls inherent in all psychological contracts.

4.0 LEADER BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES

Be Fair and Just. Leaders should never issue an order which they cannot enforce. They should promise nothing they cannot deliver. Leaders should be as good as their word, at all times and in any circumstance. Intellectual honesty demands that leaders energetically strive to refute their own convictions. If the leader has not played devil's advocate, attempting vigorously to disprove his or her own opinions, then the leader should not feel confident in his or her own particular position.

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The importance of fairness and justness extend also to the treatment of unit members. All members of a unit must share a common objective; they must be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of this objective, but they will only do so if they can be assured that others too will do their part. It is the responsibility of the leader to make sure that all members of the unit assume equal risks and make equal sacrifices in pursuit of the unit's mission. Despite the obvious importance for leaders to treat their subordinates fairly and justly, when junior enlisted soldiers who had served in combat in Iraq were surveyed about the behaviors of their non-commissioned officers (NCOs), only 41% of these junior enlisted soldiers reported that their NCOs set a single standard that everyone was expected to meet, with 43% of them reporting that their NCOs showed favoritism to certain members in the unit (Castro & McGurk, 2003/2004). Thus, from findings obtained from junior enlisted soldiers in combat, the tendency of NCOs to be just and fair is an area that the flexible pragmatic leader must master in order to become an effective leader. Soldiers will be motivated to make personal sacrifices when they can be assured of equal treatment.

Admit Mistakes. The best thing that leaders can do when they are wrong is to admit it, publicly. Naturally no one likes being contradicted and refuted so this is best done by the leaders themselves. Contrary to what many leaders may think, when leaders admit mistakes in the presence of their subordinates, their credibility and authority is enhanced because their subordinates see them as someone who is interested in the truth and who is honest and sincere. When leaders are wrong they should not be afraid to contradict their previous decisions. Failing to admit obvious mistakes only lowers the leader's prestige in the eyes of their subordinates.

Indeed, it is a common complaint amongst junior enlisted soldiers and NCOs that they are blamed when things go wrong even when they were following the orders they were given by their supervisors (Castro & McGurk, 2003/2004). Leaders should never use their subordinates as scapegoats to avoid accepting responsibility for the outcome of their decisions. Pragmatic flexible leaders accept personal blame when things go wrong, even if it wasn't their fault, yet credit all successes to their subordinates.

Underwrite Honest Mistakes. Organizations only improve when members of the organization are allowed to make mistakes. When subordinates make mistakes, but not from any lack of good will or effort, it is best for the leader to take the rap for them or to "fly high cover" for them as it is sometimes called in the military. The last thing a leader wants to do is disaffect an honest, hardworking subordinate needlessly. Not underwriting honest mistakes is a very quick way to squander any capital that leadership has brokered in the eyes of subordinates.

In interviews conducted with junior enlisted soldiers (and NCOs), we frequently hear that leaders have a hard time underwriting mistakes, with the result being that initiative is stifled. When leaders refuse to support their subordinates' honest mistakes, their subordinates will eventually stop taking the risk of demonstrating initiative and simply wait to be told what to do. As one junior non-commissioned officer deployed to Iraq noted, "Why stick your neck out, if they [the unit leadership] are just waiting to chop it off?" Flexible pragmatic leaders know the value of maintaining subordinate initiative and are willing to take the hits from time-to-time from their superiors in order to ensure that their subordinates' initiative is sustained.

Protect Subordinates. The protection of subordinates takes two forms. First, it is the duty of leaders to intervene and protect their subordinates against any manifest injustice, whatever its source. This includes abuse or harassment from other members of the unit. In fact, this trust is so implicit between leaders and subordinates that all leaders should be willing to risk their professional reputation upon it, when they are convinced that their subordinate is being unfairly assailed, or that due process is not being followed. This

protection does not extend to cheating or thwarting justice for the sake of their subordinates simply because they are their subordinates. Occasionally, higher authority overreaches; leaders must stand as a shield protecting their subordinates against unfair treatment. However, in a survey of junior enlisted soldiers who served in combat in Iraq, 53% reported that their NCOs seldom or never fought for the welfare of soldiers if it might harm their career (Castro & McGurk, 2003/2004).

Second, in combat, it is the duty of leaders to ensure that their subordinates do not assume unnecessary risks. Every soldier has the right to expect that their leaders will provide them the greatest opportunity of surviving on the battlefield. Indeed, junior leaders were rated higher in this area, with 52% of junior enlisted soldiers reporting that their NCOs ensure that they do not assume unnecessary risks when conducting combat missions in Iraq. Fifty-nine percent of these same soldiers also reported that their NCOs were concerned about their personal safety (Castro & McGurk, 2003/2004).

Communicate. Tell subordinates what is going on. Every individual in military service is entitled to the why and the wherefore of what he or she is expected to do. The individual's efficiency, confidence and enthusiasm will wax strong in response to the leader's communication about the mission or task. Leaders who believe in the importance of giving full information in a straight-forward manner, and who continue to act on that principle, will benefit over the long term by their subordinates' efforts. Here NCOs do a good job, with nearly 80% of soldiers surveyed reporting that their NCOs provide clear guidance on how tasks or missions are to be accomplished (Castro & McGurk, 2003/2004).

The problem besetting some leaders is to talk to their subordinates naturally, without yelling or screaming. Yet the skill of flexible pragmatic communication requires both sending and receiving. If subordinates can talk naturally to their leaders, the product of their resourcefulness becomes available to all. Taking counsel of subordinates in any enterprise or situation is therefore a matter of giving them full advantage of one's own information and reasoning, weighing with the intellect whatever thought or argument they may contribute to the sum of the considerations, and then making, without compromise, a clear decision as to the line of greatest advantage. To know how to command obedience is very different from making subordinates obey. Obedience is not benefited by fear, but by understanding, and understanding is based on knowledge. Subordinates should be encouraged to present their views as it is the surest way for leaders to win the confidence of their subordinates.

Visit the Troops. Meaningful contact with subordinates goes beyond merely sending information down the chain of command for dissemination. It is also absolutely critical for leaders to be with their subordinates when their subordinates are enduring hardship (e.g., deployment, rigorous training, long hours on task, being in remote sites, functioning as part of detachment). Subordinates will become discouraged and will lose their sense of direction unless the leader has face-to-face contact with them, looking in on them periodically. During visits, leaders should ask their subordinates whether they can be of help, and thus get their subordinates to open up and discuss problems that might exist. Another benefit of this type of contact is that the leader demonstrates by example that he or she is not above experiencing hardship and will personally sacrifice time, comfort, convenience, and energy to support the troops.

Surprisingly, many leaders fail to perform this simple task. In interviews with NCOs in Iraq during the first year of the war, it was a common complaint that their leaders (i.e. junior officers) never visited the troops, especially if the troops were located in a very austere environment. Naturally, the assumption was that their leaders did not want to be inconvenienced by having to travel from their air conditioned headquarters buildings to where the troops were located in 120 degrees heat. Impressively, these NCOs did not resent their

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leaders having air conditioned working environments although they themselves did not, but they did take exception to their leaders' apparent unwillingness to sacrifice a little by refusing to visit them (Castro & McGurk, 2003/2004).

Encourage Involvement. Leaders must encourage their subordinates to become involved in recognizing and solving problems. As Den Hartog et al's. (1999) multicultural study points out, a universally disliked attribute of leaders is a dictatorial style. Making subordinates a part of the solution instead of a victim of the problem is a way to instill confidence, innovation, and adaptability in a unit. If the problem is such that the subordinates cannot solve it, then the problem needs to be brought to the attention of the leader. Leaders should de-centralize information and imagination.

This focus on developing independent thinking in junior leaders is something the former Chief of the Staff of the Army, retired General Eric Shinseki, was very concerned about. In fact, Shinseki commissioned a study examining the degree to which the US Army was actually *stifling innovation* in its junior ranks (Wong, 2002). As Wong argued, when subordinates are provided the support to be proactive, innovative, and flexible, a leader is likely to ensure mission success. Thus, leaders should encourage fact-mindedness and create incentives for constructive criticism and learning that are focused on solving problems. When given a task, subordinates should be encouraged to develop alternate courses of action and to select one. When orders are unclear or ambiguous, leaders should demand that their subordinates seek and obtain clarification before executing them. No leader is on firm ground when he or she is impatient with questions which are to the point, or resentful of the subordinates who ask them.

One of the best means available to leaders to encourage involvement in the unit is to recognize and reward their subordinates. Yet, in our survey of junior enlisted soldiers who served in combat in Iraq, only 29% of junior enlisted soldiers reported that their NCOs told them when they had done a good job. And only 26% of these junior enlisted soldiers believed that their NCOs ensured that all deserving soldiers received military awards for their performance in Iraq (Castro & McGurk, 2003/2004). Acknowledging the contributions and sacrifices of subordinates is a relatively simple way of encouraging involvement, and represents one set of leader behaviors that can be taught and developed.

Team Build. Team building is the sole responsibility of the leader. The unity which develops from recognizing one's dependence upon others is the mainspring of every movement by which society and the military moves forward. One set of key leader attributes and behaviors valued across cultures is for a leader to be a team-builder (Den Hartog et al., 1999). Team building by its very nature must be inclusive to be effective; therefore, it should never be undertaken at the expense of excluding other unit members or other units. In Iraq, for instance, it was common practice to post signs limiting access to morale and welfare facilities to only "permanent" party, meaning that only soldiers assigned to that particular base camp or unit could use the phones or gymnasium facilities on that base camp. What made such exclusions infuriating to the non-permanent party soldiers was the fact these soldiers were typically combat arms soldiers who were located at remote sites where phone or gym facilities had not yet been set up. In other words, those soldiers who were assuming the greatest risks were the very ones being denied these important morale and welfare facilities. Flexible pragmatic leaders ensure that such exclusionary policies are not established, or when confronted with such policies, they quickly move to abolish them.

While the benefits of being a team-builder are obvious in their positive effects on both group and individual performance and well-being, the leader who builds teams must also be vigilant against possessive individualism and splinter factions within the unit. Both are counterproductive to group goals. Factions that

can arise within a group may split the unit and subvert unit integrity and command authority and bring about animosities among unit members. Often, individuals of these factions will voluntarily sacrifice themselves in the interest of their subgroup over that of the larger unit. If “me first” or “we first” factions emerge in a military unit, leaders must take action and deal with them swiftly even if that means transferring offending individuals to another unit. By many accounts (e.g., Taguba, 2004), the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse incidents represented actions of such a splinter faction.

Instill Discipline. The level of discipline should at all times be according to what is needed to get the best results from the majority of the subordinates. There is no practical reason for any sterner requirement than that. There is no moral justification for countenancing anything less. Discipline destroys the spirit and working loyalty of the general force when it is pitched to the minority of malcontented, unproductive individuals within the organization, whether to punish or to appease them. Discipline within the military should not be viewed as a ritual or form, but simply as the best course of conduct which is most likely to lead to efficient performance of an assigned responsibility. Subordinates are able to recognize right and reasonable discipline as such, even though it causes them personal inconvenience. But if the discipline is unduly harsh or unnecessarily lax subordinates’ morale will fall.

One of the most contentious actions that leaders can do is to create rules or policies for subordinates by which they themselves do not abide. In studies we have conducted of soldiers deployed on peacekeeping or combat operations, this has been a consistent complaint of junior enlisted soldiers and non-commissioned officers (Castro & McGurk, 2003/2004). Typically these “double standards” are seen in uniform wear and phone use, where junior officers fail to maintain the uniform standard and overuse their phone privileges, without any apparent adverse consequences. Subordinates obviously resent rules and policies when they are expected to follow them, but their leaders do not. Flexible pragmatic leaders understand that while rules and policies are important for maintaining discipline and good order, rules should not be established that they themselves do not intend to follow.

Judicious Use of Punishment. Before meting out punishment, it is necessary to judge the subordinate, and judgment means to think over, to compare, to weigh probable effects on the subordinate and on the command, and to give the offender the benefit of any reasonable doubt. Before any punishment is given, the question must be asked: “What good will it achieve?” If the answer is none, then punishment is not in order. Punishment of a vindictive nature is a crime of leadership; when it is given uselessly or handed out in a strictly routine manner, it is an immoral act. To punish a body of subordinates for offenses committed by two or three of their members, even though the offense is obnoxious and it is impossible to put the finger on the culprits, is no more excusable within a military organization than in civilian society. Any leader who resorts to this practice of “mass punishment” is likely to forfeit the loyalty of the best in his or her team.

An exemplar of this type of mass punishment was seen during the early years of the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Telephone banks were established for soldiers to use to call home to their families. However, because the telephone switching capacity was severely restricted, soldiers were required to limit their telephone calls to fifteen minutes twice a week. This was such an essential restriction in order to maintain operational effectiveness that actual telephone use was monitored by higher headquarters for compliance. Unfortunately, a few soldiers discovered a way to exceed these time limits for telephone use, resulting in phone calls exceeding two hours in duration. Unable to locate the offending soldiers, whom the leadership knew numbered less than 10 soldiers from a battalion of over 700 soldiers, phone privileges were revoked for the entire battalion for one week. From the perspective of the 690 or so soldiers who followed the telephone use rules, this punishment was seen as extremely unfair and inappropriate, especially given that this was their

primary means of communication with their families. Flexible pragmatic leaders know that mass punishment for the actions of a few only serve to lower unit morale and increase subordinate distrust in the unit's leadership.

5.0 CARDINAL PRINCIPALS OF LEADERSHIP

First Leader Principal – Leaders are personally responsible for the safety and well-being of their subordinates.

Second Leader Principal – When a regulation or policy is in the favor of the service member it is always just and equitable.

Third Leader Principal – It is the duty of all leaders to take care of the needs of their subordinates before caring for themselves.

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