

## **Chapter 2 – ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS**

by

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### **2.1 INTRODUCTION**

Between military contingents involved in multinational operations, there often exist basic organizational and cultural differences, such as the ways in which personnel are treated, the parameters within which people must work, and the very function and structure of the military organization. The management of human resources within each respective organization is often dependent on national norms and practices, as well as the unique history, tradition and modus operandi of the military forces themselves. These factors influence the way that things are done within any given national organization, the rules and regulations that are enforced, normal or expected patterns of behavior, and even the structure of the organization. The net result of these differences may be marked discrepancies between partners involved in international operations in terms of personnel policies, services and programs, doctrine, and operational functioning. Such differences could potentially hinder the success of the mission and directly or indirectly impact operational effectiveness.

This chapter deals with what are generally referred to as organizational issues, that is, issues which relate to the structure and functioning of the institution. For ease of analysis, these can be broadly divided into two general areas: personnel issues and operational issues. The former corresponds to a wide range of people-related factors pertaining to the functioning and culture of a military organization. The latter subsumes a variety of procedural and structural processes and practices that are often so embedded in the organizational culture that they prove hard to change and can create inter-group tensions in a multinational setting.

### **2.2 PERSONNEL ISSUES**

The first section of this chapter looks at the existing literature on different human resource (HR) management and personnel policies among allied nations and their impact on international operations. The differential treatment of personnel performing the same functions may have a negative impact on overall mission effectiveness, as people performing the same tasks, under the same conditions and threats, receive different treatment or rewards. Furthermore, military members may also develop negative opinions and perceptions of their own forces while deployed that might result in dissatisfaction in the short-term and retention issues in the long-term. The net result of these factors may be to inhibit the development of a healthy organizational climate, which in turn may impact the coalition's performance and the effectiveness and success of the operation (Easter, 1996).

For ease of analysis these factors can be regrouped under four broad headings: HR policy and practice, professional/organizational structure, well-being, and professional conduct:

- 1) Under the category HR policy and practice are those topics relating to national human resource practices and procedures, both formal and informal in nature, that directly affect deployed personnel. They include: general HR policies, rotation and posting policies, unionization, and financial differences.
- 2) The professional and organizational structure category includes: occupational structure, serving status (regular and reserve), role of women, and composition (ratio of gender and other diversities).
- 3) Well-being can be broadly defined to include those factors impacting the physical and mental health of personnel, either directly or indirectly. Factors included under this heading are: welfare,

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mental and physical health and well-being policy, living conditions, psychological contract, and perceived social support.

- 4) The final category labelled professional conduct relates to the maintenance of discipline and professional conduct within a military force and encompasses criminality and the military; discipline and disciplinary procedures; alcohol, drugs, and pornography; honours and awards; and ethical issues.

The recent nature of truly joint multinational operations has meant that research on the issues and problems arising from these operations have been somewhat scant. However, owing to their increased frequency a body of research has been building that has dealt with most, if not all, the factors listed above. Although limited, this work allows for the identification of the more pertinent issues and problems affecting such missions. This chapter will look at these topics and summarize some of the more relevant work pertaining to each, pointing to areas in need of further research.

### 2.2.1 HR Policy and Practice

Deploying nations participating in common international missions have often developed different human resource management policies and programs in response to different economic, political, and social considerations within their own societies. Once developed, these policies become part of the terms and conditions of employment for personnel and can be difficult to change. This may be due to legal and moral constraints or to the fact that such policies become standards that personnel and bureaucracies are familiar with and are frequently loathe to change. However, as Gareis et al. (2003) point out, these factors can affect “multinational interaction through the mechanism that soldiers and co-workers, in daily interaction, will tend to compare their own national systems with each other, and may in many cases react with, at least, partial dissatisfaction” (pp. 52-53).

Many studies on multinational operations have discussed the potentially negative impact of the gap in salaries and allowances between coalition partners (Bernardova, Strobl, Falar, & Palanova, 2001; Gareis et al., 2003; Winslow, 1999). Personnel from different countries performing the same or similar work alongside each other will tend to compare financial and other rewards. While in some cases, researchers noted that discussion of salaries was carefully avoided it is likely that people will find out who earns what within the collaborative setting of a multinational operation (Gareis et al., 2003).

One obvious negative impact of differential pay scales is that those who are paid at a lower rate may feel undervalued by their governments and militaries. Disaffection with a member’s own force can lead to serious morale problems both in the field and on return home. Furthermore, the work performance of lower paid personnel may be negatively impacted. These people may feel that they need not perform at the highest standard or do as much as those who are paid more. Their motivation and commitment may be undermined (Gareis et al., 2003). While no research has been conducted on the long-term impact of this exposure to differential rewards, it may be the case that retention rates are lower among personnel returning from deployment where such differences were apparent. This could be due to the effects on morale or general dissatisfaction with existing salary and benefits of their own nations.

The relatively poorer financial situation of some militaries may also impact interaction between deployed groups. Those who have lower salaries may not be able to afford to engage socially with members from other, better paid contingents. As Gareis et al. (2003) point out, this was the case with Polish members of the Multinational Corps Northeast. Informal socializing can be an important contributor to better understanding between nations and a better working relationship between contingents. Where this socialization is absent, overall effectiveness may be undermined. Limited social interaction may also lead to the reinforcement of stereotypes or make it more difficult to break down preconceived notions regarding other nations.

Resentment between national contingents may arise due to disparities in salaries and benefits. Feelings of relative deprivation may give rise to varying levels of animosity focussed on other nations, particularly if negative stereotypes already exist. These negative feelings will inhibit the building of trust, mutual respect, and cooperation between the coalition partners and affect the establishment of a healthy organizational climate. As Easter points out, “A pervasive sense of equality helps to create a positive organizational climate” (1996, p. 10).

Incentives, both non-monetary and financial, given to deployed troops can vary considerably between nations. For Czech personnel deployed in Kosovo, the average income was up to five times greater than that at home (Bernardova et al., 2001). Winslow (1999) reported that Canadians deployed in Kosovo received additional financial incentives that they viewed as highly important since “It can help you get out of debt, buy a car or make the down payment on a house” (p. 11). Forces from other countries may see no difference in income from deployment or may be relatively worse off as was the case with British troops redeployed from Germany to Kosovo. Differential commitment to the mission may be an unwanted result of this disparity.

Between various coalition nations there may be differences in working hours, vacation allowances, and other non-monetary benefits. These factors can have a negative impact on group cohesion, morale and effectiveness by further highlighting disparities in treatment. They can also present serious administrative and logistical challenges to coalition leaders trying to ensure proper staffing levels to meet all aspects of the mission. In the Multinational Corps Northeast, for example, rules varied between the members of three nations (Poles, Germans, and Danes) regarding travel time to their home country for vacation and personal reasons (Gareis et al., 2003). This one difference in itself may not significantly impact group effectiveness but it is not difficult to see how in larger, multinational coalitions, the cumulative effect of a myriad of allowance and leave rules can pose serious challenges.

In terms of group interaction, there may also be negative feelings owing to disparities in allowances and benefits. Winslow (1999) reports that in interviews with Canadian soldiers in Kosovo, some commented that “other contingents think we are soft because we give our people three weeks leave and extra money for deploying overseas” (p. 17). As Winslow suggested, issues such as this may reinforce notions that some national contingents are not as professional as others and cannot be relied on to do the job.

While rules and allowances differ between nations, there may also be noticeable national differences in the application of the rules. Some nations may have a tradition of flexibility while others may have more rigid codes (Gareis et al., 2003). HR policies and practices will vary depending on the national standards of each of the contributing forces to the coalition. It may be difficult for personnel from one contingent to understand why they face relatively inflexible rules while other partners appear to enjoy a more liberal regime. Some contingents may also allow for an appeals process in the application of rules and procedures while others may not.

### **2.2.1.1 Unions**

One important contributing factor to the development and implementation of differential HR policies and practices between national militaries may be the existence of military forces unions or professional associations. While many European countries allow for the unionization of military personnel, few, if any, militaries elsewhere in the world permit such associations. In six European countries alone (Sweden, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium), there were some 60 military organizations in 1993 (Stites, 1993). These associations had a varying ability to negotiate terms and conditions of employment. The Dutch and German unions, for example, were limited to a consultative role while the Swedish forces had full collective bargaining rights (Stites, 1993).

The existence or lack of such associations may reflect national differences in how the military is viewed. As Stites (1993) points out, military unionization would appear to indicate a less authoritarian organization

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and one that reflects the notion of an occupation rather than a profession. Within a multinational context, non-unionized militaries may view those with unions as less disciplined, more poorly organized, and having less of a military culture. These attitudes in turn can affect the way in which various contingents interact with each other and in the establishment of trust in the competency and commitment of others.

On the practical side, the existence of unions will undoubtedly mean that militaries organized in this way will have rules for grievances and appeal that will not exist elsewhere. Terms and conditions of employment will also be contained within collective agreements and may not be open to change or amendment to suit changing circumstances in theater. It may be the case that such agreements constrain coalition commanders who may have to utilize some contingents to a greater extent rather than contravene collective agreements. At the very least, there will be administrative challenges in coordinating mixed unionized and non-unionized contingents. However, there may also be complaints of unfair or preferential treatment given to those with collective agreements over those without such legal safeguards.

### 2.2.1.2 Deployment

Length of deployment and frequency of rotation vary quite significantly by country. In some cases, nations will post personnel into multinational operations for as little as 4 months. Other countries have requirements for 1-year deployments. As Elron, Shamir, and Ben-Ari (1999) have pointed out, “Such rotation further increases the challenge of achieving high coordination, swift trust, and smooth operation in a culturally diverse workforce” (p. 83).

It is argued that longer deployments are necessary to allow for greater familiarization with the theater of operations and permit greater stability for the multinational force. Lengthier tours of duty also ease the pressures of training and relocating replacement troops on the part of donor countries, particularly those with limited resources. Even senior United States (US) Army officials have expressed concerns that the Army at its current size and configuration cannot meet projected requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan unless active duty and reserve troops spend 12 months in combat zones (Shaker & Schmitt, 2004).

Shorter stays, on the other hand, can prevent problems that arise due to boredom and routine. This is especially true in operations where there are limited facilities and troops are offered few outlets for relaxation. Furthermore, sustained exposure to hostile populations, as in Somalia and Iraq, can lead to a sapping of morale and the emergence of psychological problems among troops. The fact that the stay is of limited duration may assist in alleviating these potential problems. Further, shorter deployments may be easier on families, and in general, different tour lengths can have varying implications for families. Shaker and Schmitt (2004), reporting on the US Army’s experience with 12-month deployments, state that many senior army officers have reported a potential erosion of the Army’s ability to recruit and retain personnel unless tours of duty are shortened to 6 to 9 months.

Administratively and logistically, important issues arise from the varying lengths of tours of each national contingent. Systems and practices worked out with one rotation will often have to be worked out anew with the next rotation from that donor nation. Personal relationships and informal friendships and networks built up between national contingents will have to be renegotiated after each change in personnel due to the differing times of rotation and differing lengths of postings. The impact of these networks and relationships on operational effectiveness should not be underestimated. Coming from many different cultures, speaking a number of languages, and governed by varying military traditions, coalitions can be awkward and unworkable without the informal grid of relationships that build up between individuals.

Multinational coalitions often face the problem of multiple languages being spoken among contingents. Using a common language such as English to overcome this language barrier can assist in ensuring effective communications. However, as others (e.g., Stewart, Bonner & Verrall, 2001) have pointed out, working in a second language can be difficult even for more fluent speakers of the other language given the use of slang

and technical terms. Furthermore, this communication problem can exacerbate the normal stresses and strains of working in theater. As Ryan (2000) and Gillespie (2002) have shown, within the context of multinational operations, even individuals who are native speakers of the same language may miss nuances and subtle meanings because of dialects, pronunciation and unfamiliar nonverbal cues. Exposure over a period of time to particular expressions of verbal and nonverbal communication of commands and orders within a coalition can ensure more effective response and smoother operations (see also Riedel, Chapter 6). If personnel change on a frequent basis then they may not be able to achieve the necessary levels of comprehension to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission.

Phased rotation of troops, as Palin suggests, would certainly help ease transitions and avoid the loss of experience and knowledge (1995). However, each nation in a coalition has control over its own contingent. National governments may be unwilling to relinquish this control to a coalition commander from another country, making the likelihood of such planned rotations very slim.

One seemingly effective mechanism for getting past this problem is through the training and use of liaison officers (Ryan, 2000). These personnel could be placed for longer periods of time than their national contingents and could establish initial networks and working relationships that then could be more fully utilized by their deploying troops. Palin (1995) and Gillespie (2002) offer an alternative solution of greater use of liaison officers administratively and at the headquarters level. By clearly defining terms and describing courses of actions, uncertainty may be minimized even where contingents normally use different languages. For Gillespie, a good example of what might be effective is the NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) which “incorporate the lexicons from the alliance forces, and translate them into a common technical language that is readily understood” (p. 18).

### **2.2.2 Professional and Organizational Structure**

Most militaries throughout the world have adopted a hierarchical command structure. In multinational operations, therefore, one would not anticipate too many problems or issues between contingents in terms of command and control. However, there can be quite marked differences between forces in terms of the degree and extent of hierarchical control. Indeed, many militaries have become “flatter” organizations. This has been due in part to societal pressures. This trend can also be attributed to the development of technology and non-traditional concepts such as a networked force, which requires less control from the center, and has led to the opening up of traditional structures.

Regardless of current trends, some forces have had a more open, egalitarian structure than others for some time. At one end of the spectrum, the Swedish Armed Forces have traditionally been more open and flatter than, for example, the British or American militaries. This variation in rigidity leads to varying types of interaction among ranks. In comparing Dutch and Germans in the Multinational Corps Northeast, Gareis et al. (2003) observed that “German soldiers indicated that the tone in the Dutch armed forces was more loose and friendly than in the Bundeswehr” (p. 32). Conversely, the same study showed that the Dutch contingent saw the tone in the Bundeswehr as “rougher and more rigorous” (Gareis et al., 2003, p. 32). Winslow (1999) noted that in Kosovo there were significant differences between contingents in the relationships between officers and senior non-commissioned members that occurred within contingents. During Operation Desert Storm, the American military personnel “reported a remoteness between soldiers, NCOs, and officers in the Saudi military” (Luft, 2002, p. 262).

In multinational operations, members of one national contingent may find themselves at odds with officers from another contingent because of differences in style stemming from historical and traditional patterns of interaction. This may work in different ways, in that people may be equally offended by over-familiarity as by formality. Furthermore, these differing styles may prevent the development of trust and cohesion between groups. Personnel who are used to more formal interaction with officers may not have the same respect for officers from other countries with less rigid traditions. Informality may be viewed as unprofessional (Luft, 2002).

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Attitudes towards other contingents can also be affected by the serving status of contingent members. In many cases military forces will be composed of conscripts. These personnel are often viewed differently from enlisted members of a force, who are seen as more professional. Even though troops may be competent and have adequate training and experience, the fact that they are conscripts rather than volunteers may influence opinion and interaction (Winslow, 1999; see also Browne, Chapter 8).

Similarly, personnel belonging to the reserves may be seen as not at the same standard of professionalism as those in the regular forces (Winslow, 1999). Many countries have had to use reservists increasingly in deployed situations due to the increased tempo of operations and the over-commitment of regular forces. This has been the case for some time with the Canadian Forces and is evidenced among US Forces deployed to Iraq. The notion that part-time soldiers have acquired the same military skill sets as those in full-time service may not be subscribed to by many of the latter group.

The increased tempo of operations in the past few years has been coupled with an increased complexity in missions. Troops now use more technologically advanced equipment and deal with a wider range of ethnic groups, social issues and legal problems. The expertise necessary to successfully complete a mission may be missing from a contingent without the assistance of reservists. Using their specialist skills on an as-needed basis will undoubtedly mean that reservists will become more commonly deployed. Clearly, this necessitates the development of new strategies to deal with the observed negative attitudes of regular forces to reservists.

In the Canadian case, as Winslow (1999) points out, younger reservists were supervised by senior regular force personnel in order to ensure that work was carried out properly and as a way of helping to integrate them into the team. In interviews with personnel in Kosovo, it was recommended to Winslow that reservists also be given greater opportunities to work with their battle groups prior to deployment. In this way, reservists could establish relationships and gain the confidence of the regular forces that would be deployed with them, prior to being put into harm's way.

Increasingly, multinational operations involve contingents from very diverse backgrounds. Creating a harmonious working relationship between national contingents may be something of a challenge if they are composed of members from ethnic or religious groups with an historical animosity. Care needs to be taken, therefore, to ensure that potential points of conflict are avoided throughout the course of the operation. The same is true for dealings with local populations who may be distrustful of some national contingents, again owing to historical ethnic, cultural, political and economic differences.

Even where contingents have little or no history of conflict, stereotypes may interfere with the smooth accomplishment of a mission. The negative impact of stereotyping on group cohesion has been noted in a number of studies (Gareis et al., 2003; Ryan, 2000). What is clear, however, is that continued interaction between contingents can, in some cases, lessen the validity of stereotypes and help to minimize possible negative outcomes.

The composition of national forces, to a greater or lesser degree, will reflect the demographic reality of each nation. The Canadian Forces, for example, is committed to broad ethnic and gender representation and aims to bring the Forces more in line with the demographic and ethnic profile of the working population. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the most recent Canadian defence statement, expanding the forces by up to 8000 personnel, specifically targets Canada's ethnic population for recruiting priority (Department of National Defence, 2005).

Avoiding inter-ethnic issues between contingents may be even more difficult within ethnically heterogeneous contingents. It may prove impossible and unreasonable to take some members out of their contingent because of their ethnic background and the possibility that this may result in tension with the local population or other contingents. Issues around color or religion of contingent members may exacerbate these possible dangers.

The composition of military contingents will also vary on the basis of gender. Many nations still restrict women's involvement in, or exclude them completely from, military service. Owing to cultural and religious prohibitions, women in most Arab and many developing countries have few roles to play in the military. At the other end of the spectrum, some countries (e.g., Canada and Sweden) permit women in all branches of the forces and in all roles, including combat (Davis & McKee, 2005).

However, even countries with restrictions on women's involvement in military operations have found themselves employing women to help supplement overstretched resources. Women make up 20% of the US military (Marshall, Kaiser, & Kessmeier, 1997) and though officially they are not allowed to play combat roles, it is estimated that some 26,000 women served in Operation Desert Storm (Luft, 2002). These numbers may have been surpassed in the current deployment of troops to Iraq.

The increased use of women in theater has been precipitated not only by national pressures but also by the very nature of many coalition operations. Working in traditional societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan, coalition forces have realized the need for women in dealing with the women of the host populations. In Afghanistan, the US Army used women in combat zones to conduct searches of Afghan women so as not to offend the local population, in spite of the fact that this contravened official policy (Stars and Stripes, 2002). Furthermore, in tense situations which arise in the complex missions of many coalition operations, some countries have found that the use of women can defuse potentially hostile situations (DeGroot, 1996).

Regardless of the roles that women play in militaries, an increasing reality of many multinational operations is the presence of women within national contingents. For some, the involvement of women can be offensive, unless there is a real physical separation of the sexes. Jewish law (Halacha) forbids the sharing of close quarters by unrelated males and females, something which may occur within military operations (Jerusalem Post, 2001).

The relatively subordinate role of women in some societies also makes it difficult for some military personnel to take orders from females and can offend local populations. Luft (2002) notes that in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm, Saudis were embarrassed by the fact that women were protecting them. Furthermore, Saudi soldiers lost some respect for their American counterparts when they observed them taking commands from women (Luft, 2002). Indeed, the role of women in the US forces in Saudi Arabia became a diplomatic issue when local women began emulating female American personnel who regularly drove trucks and cars. This led to the issuing of an order by the Saudi ruler: "US female military personnel in uniform are not women when driving military vehicles" (Luft, 2002, p. 285).

Female personnel coming from less traditional societies where women enjoy equal rights with men may experience particularly trying situations in more traditional, host countries. While their male counterparts may be allowed to socialize with locals, leave bases, or fully enjoy free time, the same freedoms may not be extended to female personnel. The impact on morale among mixed-gender contingents of such differential treatment may interfere with effective operations and successful mission accomplishment. Furthermore, if female personnel find themselves restricted in terms of their jobs so as not to offend the sensitivities of other contingents or the indigenous population, then they may feel less prone to remain in the forces on return to their home country.

Interaction between contingents may also be affected by the presence of women in one force and their absence in others. Even when contingents come from less traditional societies where women have assumed a wide variety of roles, there may be difficulties for some troops who are unused to women in uniform and in combat. Seeing female casualties, taking orders from women officers, and dealing with women in close proximity in what has traditionally been an all-male environment can cause stresses and strains in a coalition and hinder effective cooperation and the building of good working relationships (Winslow, 1999).

While negative attitudes towards the presence of women in a contingent can cause difficulties among coalition partners, equally contentious is the fact that some national armies permit openly gay and lesbian personnel. Social, religious, and national taboos and biases against homosexuals can lead to friction between coalition partners and between contingents and the host society. That gays and lesbians are less visible than women or ethnic minorities may serve to lessen tension. However, attitudes between national contingents may be colored by the openness of homosexual participation in one group and the exclusion of gays and lesbians from other militaries (Bateman & Dalvi, 2004).

### 2.2.3 Well-Being

Ensuring the physical and mental well-being of personnel, particularly in a deployed situation is of critical importance to military organizations. In order to cope with the stresses and strains of operations, and to perform the mission, staff must be in good physical and mental condition. Frequently, resources are not as available for some contingents as for others. The more affluent or better funded militaries will be able to provide a wider range of more comprehensive services to their troops. This can include better training equipment, sports facilities and gyms, as well as better social, medical and psychological support programs and services. In many deployments today, for example, Canada will include a military psychologist in the contingent (Winslow, 1999).

Within a coalition deployment, the better equipped partners can often provide support to the other contingents and ensure that there is access to quality services for all. However, with rotation, these same resources can be withdrawn, leaving the coalition in worse condition. As Davis et al. (2003) observed in the Balkans, the pullout of British troops brought with it the loss of important intratheater ground transportation of patients. Among other things, this withdrawal also meant that there were no longer helicopters available for MEDEVAC. With no other partners immediately able to supplement for the loss of service, the mission could have been jeopardized (Davis et al., 2003). While coalition partners may attempt to plan ahead so as to cover these contingencies, the deployment of forces is up to individual nations and not up to the coalition leaders. In the Balkan case, other nations were able to fill the gaps but only after a period of loss of service.

With the diversity between groups of coalition partners being deployed in recent years, the disparities in services offered by various contingents has become greater than ever. Smaller African contingents, for example, have not been able to provide the same level of health services available to their larger US or United Kingdom (UK) counterparts. For this reason, the larger contingents may find themselves under increasing pressure to service non-nationals and other personnel. This can lead to an over-reliance on one partner as evidenced by the example above. This can also lead to undue pressures being placed on the resources of one or a few partners. Prior to deployment, each nation will allocate resources to meet the needs of its contingent. However, when these same resources are called into service for the entire mission, dealing with far greater numbers of personnel than anticipated, it may lead to an undermining of these services or a diminution in the quality of the service provided.

Davis et al. (2003) observed that in multinational coalition forces, there are often lower levels of pre-deployment medical screening, preventive medicine support, and medical and dental readiness. This appears to be most common among soldiers from developing nations and former Soviet Republics. This may mean the incidence of a larger range of health problems which can be greater in deployment than was the case in the past. Medics must deal with conditions, illnesses, and issues that were less prevalent in the past when the deployed contingent was healthier and better looked after prior to going on mission.

The fact that members of different contingents have varying levels of health preparedness prior to deployment may also affect the success of a mission. If a commander cannot rely on some contingents to perform because of overall health concerns, including lack of physical fitness, medical problems or other considerations, then this may lead to a situation where operations are inhibited or where some contingents

are relied upon more heavily than others. The possible over-use of one national contingent may over time lead to the emergence of health issues among these personnel. They could be subject to exhaustion, burn-out, depression and other physical and psychological conditions that result from being called upon more than was originally planned and, for medical personnel specifically, to be required to deal with a greater array of ailments and medical conditions than anticipated (Davis et al., 2003).

Providing medical assistance to troops is vital to the physical well-being of these personnel. However, the fact that such resources exist and can be counted on in time of need is important for the maintenance of the morale of those deployed. As Verrall (2003) states, expectation of, and confidence in, the very best quality medical care realistically achievable in a theater of operations is central to morale. This is particularly the case among contingents from more developed nations. For North American and Western European personnel, for example, standards of health services are very high for the general population, military included. Even in deployment, expectations are that a certain level and quality of service will be provided. Where this is not the case, personnel may feel that they are not being looked after appropriately and may be reluctant or unwilling to go into harm's way. Furthermore, as Verrall points out, lack of services may lead to litigation.

The provision of medical and social services and recreation and fitness facilities, among other things, is necessary to ensure that troops are physically and mentally prepared to meet the challenges of the mission. However, what such programs and policies underscore is the notion that deployed troops will be looked after while in hazardous situations. The unwritten contract between deployed personnel and their military leaders involves establishing trust that the enlisted personnel will conduct operations as ordered and that their leaders will ensure that they have their needs met. That most Western militaries have now developed a wide range of well-being policies and programs testifies to the increased importance of these non-financial supports in maintaining morale and cohesion among forces.

Once more, however, the differential provision of such services between forces in a coalition situation may exacerbate feelings of relative deprivation and animosity or jealousy between contingents. It can also lead to the sense among some contingents that others are pampered, which may impact group cohesion. This can also be the case when there is a notable disparity in living conditions between contingents. The fact that better funded militaries can afford to set up camps where living conditions are more than adequate may reinforce divisions in a multinational coalition similar to those arising from disparities in income and service provision.

As has been said, for some deployed troops, a manifestation of public support for their efforts is the provision of what they would view as adequate services and programs. The impact of such perceived public support on the morale and willingness of some contingents to engage in a mission should not be underestimated. Furthermore, the vagaries of public opinion back home directly impact a mission through the curtailing of activities or even the withdrawal of troops (see also Browne, Chapter 8). Canadian public opinion, for example, has long been favorable to Canadian Forces participation in peacekeeping missions but opposed to coalitions engaged in wars. This has led to selective deployments of Canadian troops over the last few decades and to restrictions being placed on the role played by the Canadian Forces in coalitions. Commanders in the field daily face situations requiring that they assess the risk of an operation and weigh this against public and political opinion back home, especially if casualties may result from the decision. While such considerations are important for militaries from liberal democracies, such may not be the case for those from societies with less open regimes. Commanders from such countries may find it difficult to understand why others do not simply look at the military considerations of an action or plan and act accordingly.

#### **2.2.4 Professional Conduct**

Even seemingly similar nations may differ fundamentally in their outlook and views on moral and ethical behavior. Canada and the US may share the longest open border in the world but there exists a well

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documented gulf in basic values between the populations of the two neighbors (Adams, 1997, 2004). Given the fact that military organizations will reflect the core values and beliefs of their native countries, it comes as no surprise that the US and Canadian Forces are different in a number of important ways, such as the degree of formality between ranks. Within coalition situations, where contingents are drawn from many nations, the differences in values, attitudes, and behaviors can be vastly different from one national group to another. While sharing a “military” culture, national contingents will reveal many other cultural differences. In particular, these militaries will come together with varying notions and perceptions of acceptable behavior. Reconciling these differences may prove difficult, if not impossible, for commanders, and can have a negative impact on operational effectiveness (see Febbraro, Chapter 3).

Nuciari (2002), citing a survey of NATO troops, indicated that one-quarter of those surveyed saw different ethical codes as a source of intercultural problematic relations in coalitions. A number of studies of multinational operations have highlighted the fact that differences in ethical behavior can undermine operations (Gillespie, 2002; Winslow, 1999). Much of this debate, however, comes from a Western perspective on what is acceptable behavior for military personnel and does not take into consideration the cultural background of each contingent.

In the Balkans, it was noted by Canadian troops participating in multinational operations that some foreign forces became involved in the black market (Winslow, 1999). Certain national contingents felt that this was a legitimate way to supplement their income and reflected fairly normal practices in their home countries. Similarly, accepting bribes was commonplace among some troops, much to the annoyance of the Canadian contingent (Winslow, 1999). Such behavior also led to the questioning of the professionalism of personnel from those nations taking part in such activities.

A number of respondents to a Canadian Ethics Survey conducted among military personnel mentioned the fact that among some contingents in deployment in the Balkans, officers would allocate United Nations (UN) food rations by rank and keep some for sale on the black market (Winslow, 1999). Canadian egalitarian values and notions teach that it is the duty of officers to look after enlisted personnel and as such, Canadian personnel were deeply offended by such behavior. Such actions then directly impacted the way in which the Canadians viewed these officers, undermining trust and giving rise to a sense that some people were not to be depended on to protect the troops.

However, in some operations, bribery on the part of locals to extract favors or secure contracts or employment from the international contingent has been quite common. In Kosovo, people seeking work frequently attempted to bribe the Canadian officers in charge of assigning contracts (Winslow, 1999). The local population deemed this as an acceptable and normal form of behavior. However, for the Canadians this was viewed as unethical and caused them to question the morality of the population. This culture clash between the contingent and the local population that they were seeking to protect can clearly undermine relationships and cause personnel to question what they are doing in the host country.

Involvement in black-marketeering and bribery are only some of the manifestations of varying ethical codes among contingents in multinational operations. Gillespie (2002), referring to actions in Kosovo, speaks of sexual harassment and abuse towards the indigenous population on the part of some troops. For these personnel, their behavior may be viewed as an acceptable practice as measured by the values of the host country or their country of origin.

However, not all unethical behavior should be attributed to cultural differences. Indeed, some activities may be deemed as unethical or improper in the country of origin of the perpetrator. Furthermore, a host of other explanatory factors may be at work to help explain behavior. In Lebanon, for example, pilfering by UNIFIL troops was commonplace (Plante, 1998). However, UN officials in that country argued that “this could not only be considered as a way of compensating for low salaries but as a confluence of additional factors that included motivation and training for UN peacekeeping services, deficiencies in

military leadership and cultural variations concerning what was or was not acceptable behavior” (Plante, 1998, p. 4).

The fact that some types of behavior are universally considered inappropriate, unethical, or wrong, can lead to the development of some fairly broad principles of ethical behavior for adoption by international coalitions. To elaborate a detailed or extensive code of ethics that would fit all nations would be ambitious to say the least. However, setting down some basic principles to be adhered to by all contingents would be a start and allow commanders to exercise some measure of discipline. Such a code, however, would need to incorporate or accommodate cultural sensitivities and religious requirements.

Deciding on what is or is not an appropriate behavior has typically been left up to individual national commanders in the area of operations. In some instances, direct national pressure has led to the development of policy in the field. This was the case when Canada restricted alcohol consumption by imposing limits on military personnel on active duty owing to some high profile incidents that were believed to have been precipitated by alcohol. The fact that Canadian soldiers had a two-beer limit while deployed did not sit well with many personnel. This is particularly the case in more difficult postings where troops have few if any other recreational outlets (Dunn & Fleming, 2001).

Alcohol consumption offers a clear example of the difficulties in developing a policy applicable to all contingents around acceptable behaviors. For religious reasons, many nations forbid alcohol completely. In others, alcohol is part of the way of life. As Dzvonik, Retzlaff, and Popa (2004) show in a study of US, Romanian, and Slovak aviators, attitudes to alcohol consumption varied markedly among these national contingents. Romanians and Slovaks had a “more positive attitude to and tolerance of alcohol consumption” than their American counterparts (Dzvonik et al., 2004, p. 5).

A clearer consensus may exist around the inappropriateness of the use of drugs in the field. Almost all nations have sanctions against recreational drug use. However, in practice, some are more lax at imposing these rules in operations, as witnessed by the prevalence of drug use among American soldiers in Vietnam. Furthermore, while use of any drugs may be frowned upon, some countries impose lesser penalties for the use of marijuana, while others do not make distinctions between various drugs.

Commanders of international coalitions, in seeking to impose discipline, are presented with a myriad of national rules and regulations, accepted behaviors, and values that make this task virtually impossible. However, commanders must be seen to be fair to all and differential imposition of penalties and restrictions will not be viewed favorably by personnel from the various contingents. Canadian military personnel in Kosovo, for example, felt that they were being hard-pressed because of limitations on alcohol consumption while other national contingents had either no limits or had higher limits for their personnel (Dunn & Flemming, 2001).

Not only do contingents have a different sense of acceptable and unacceptable behavior, when people do infringe on regulations, punishment can vary depending on the national customs and practices of the military concerned. In some cases, what would solicit a rebuke in one group may warrant much more serious action within another. Theft, for example, is viewed harshly in some countries and can result in the imposition of serious penalties, such as the severing of a hand. In others, depending on the amount taken or the value of the item, theft may be seen as a petty crime and warrant only a fine. Similarly, drunkenness can be viewed in some militaries as harmless and acceptable while in others it may be seen as a serious religious and moral infraction.

### **2.3 OPERATIONAL ISSUES**

While impacting contingent members within the organization and affecting what they do and the way they do it, organizational factors are seen as operating at a different level from those listed under the category

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of personnel. Rather than dealing with human resource issues, these factors pertain to processes and practices within the military organization and between the military and other stakeholders and actors.

For ease of analysis, these topics can usefully be categorized into those that are related to the internal working of an organization, or internal operations, and those that impact relationships with others and might be classified under external relations. These are not seen as entirely discrete divisions but rather as a useful way of organizing what would otherwise be a diverse and wide range of issues. This should assist in the identification of problems and possible solutions. Internal operations factors, therefore, would include: organizational structure (perceived and real), organizational processes (tempo, complexity, quality), and centralization/decentralization. External relations, while still referring to some internal organizational issues, nevertheless may be said to more directly impact the way in which that organization interacts with other militaries, civilians, and enemies. These factors then include: doctrine and concepts, rules of engagement, pooling resources, sharing capabilities, specialization, CIMIC policy (i.e., policy affecting civil-military co-operation), and media/military interface.

In other sections of this report, a number of these listed factors are addressed either in part or whole and are therefore only briefly alluded to here. Furthermore, as elsewhere, the relative recency of research in this area means that some of the listed topics are not fully explored in existing references. However, where possible, some speculative comments will be made regarding potential problematic areas based on experience in other organizations and situations.

### 2.3.1 Internal Organizational Processes

The way in which military organizations are structured may appear on the surface to be similar regardless of the nation concerned. However, history, tradition, and cultural and national differences have imprinted themselves on all militaries and have led to what are sometimes quite stark differences in structure. Furthermore, the dominant economic and political beliefs of each country will lead to the emergence of specific types of organizations reflective of these underlying values. Liberal democracies tend to give rise to more open, flatter organizational structures which allow for communication up and down the chain of command. Decision making is similarly open and transparent. Paths for promotion and upward mobility are clearly laid out and governed, or at least protected, by law so that those with grievances have avenues for appeal both within and outside of the organization. Obviously, this structure is one that is not apparent in more totalitarian societies or in those with strong class or caste systems. Furthermore, in some nations, it may be acceptable to have biased hiring practices, less objective promotion systems and a greater tendency to secrecy and exclusion. All of these differences apparent in civil society will also be observable among military organizations.

The influence of the US and the UK, among others, on the militaries of developing countries is certainly visible when one looks at the outward manifestations of military culture (e.g., ceremonies, uniforms, and rank structure). However, much of this similarity is only superficial. Underneath the surface, the many cultural adaptations and modifications that may differentiate contingents mean that we are not dealing with the same kinds of institutions. However, because of external similarities, there may be expectations that all coalition partners will act in the same way and adhere to the same organizational structure. When this is not seen to be the case, there may be a reinforcement of racial and ethnic stereotypes that may have a negative impact on the mission.

As mentioned before, the more strictly hierarchical militaries of the developing world and former eastern bloc countries produce an organizational structure that can be less flexible and open to change. Particularly in an operational setting, some nations have a tendency to relax the hierarchical chain of command. This not only provides flexibility but helps retain solidarity and a high level of camaraderie. To others who may view these same nations as lax in terms of rules, such informality may only hinder the building of trust across contingents. So, for example, the notion of the strategic corporal is one that has

become accepted within many militaries and has been accommodated through structural changes. Such a concept would appear to be anathema to a number of military organizations who might see independent actions on the part of junior enlisted soldiers as insubordination.

In building an organization to control and coordinate multinational contingents, thought must be given to the differential structures of various military contingents. If an organization is to be developed that will run smoothly, commanders must be sensitive to the processes and procedures of each partner (see Febraro, Chapter 3). While some may be uncomfortable with the way that other militaries structure their organization, they must be prepared to accommodate these differences for the sake of the smooth running of the mission.

One other major concern when setting up a structure to engage in a multinational operation is ensuring inclusion of all coalition partners. However, not all parties in the coalition will have equal access to resources or training, have acquired the same capabilities, or will adhere to the same logistical or administrative doctrine (Marshall et al., 1997). It becomes more important, at some points, then, to have an inclusive organization rather than one structured for maximum operational efficiency.

The fact that some military forces are more fully equipped with modern weaponry than others raises the question of interoperability in multinational coalitions. Trying to build an organization around what can be considerable differences in resources between contingents can lead to frustration and friction. Those who have the resources may find them stretched to the limit as they seek to provide for those that are less well equipped. One way in which this has been handled in the field is through the division of responsibilities on a geographic basis (Marshall et al., 1997). Another possible solution is employing different contingents to fulfil different specific functions for which they are more equipped and capable. In East Timor, Ryan (2000) reported that some contingents unprepared for hostilities chose instead to concentrate on the social reconstruction side of the mission by providing medical and agricultural assistance.

Not only will nations differ in terms of the structure of their military organizations but such differences will also be apparent in the processes adopted by each contingent. Formal meetings with strict agendas, time frames, and terms of reference are the hallmark of most organizations, military and civilian, in the West. As Ryan observes, "Western operational culture emphasizes a brusque can-do approach that is entirely appropriate where all parties understand each other" (2000, p. 93). This is not so in much of the rest of the world. Business is conducted in many countries in a more informal and relaxed manner. Indeed many Western observers might see this approach as unbusinesslike. However, others would view this less rigid approach as part of the way in which to do business well: getting to know people, socializing, and building a relationship. In the context of a multinational deployment, it may be seen by some contingents as rude and unfriendly if meetings are conducted according to a Western business model. As Ryan further comments, "It is no use for Western troops to exhibit impatience with their partners; the cohesion of the force and the potential contribution made by other forces is too important for that" (p. 93).

Again, in many Western societies, business models stress the need for speedy decision making and an increased efficiency in performing work and accomplishing specific goals. Other cultures promote a more measured approach, with less stress being placed on time and more on quality and interpersonal interaction. Within a military operational setting, these differences can lead to tension and misunderstanding. On the one hand, there will be those who feel that decisions are being made too quickly and in an ill-considered manner. On the other hand, there will be those who think that valuable time is being lost in discussion and consultation that would be better spent in action. The diplomatic and political necessities underscoring any international mission make it imperative that these diverse approaches be blended to make for a workable coalition where all partners feel included.

Decentralized militaries allow for a greater degree of decision making in the theater of operations without constant reference back to the country of origin. However, clearly this will not work with those militaries

that prefer a more centralized approach. This may cause delays in theater that some see as unnecessary. In Somalia, the constant need for some contingents to refer orders back to the national command proved to be a problem when operational tempo increased (Ryan, 2000). Furthermore, difficulties may arise in developing a command structure in theater with key actors having diverging views on the appropriate degree of centralization of authority. It may be argued, however, that the very nature of coalitions is one that promotes less centralized authority, allowing varying national contingents the ability to exercise authority in their preferred way. The basis for a workable coalition, however, remains negotiation and compromise.

### 2.3.2 External Relations

How a military organization relates to external agencies, friendly or hostile, is generally governed by the prevailing doctrine. Establishing parameters within which the organization can operate, the appropriate structure, the function of personnel, and the scope of action of those in command and those receiving orders, constitutes the basic military organizational doctrine. Put more succinctly, military doctrine is what we believe about the best way to conduct military affairs (Drew & Snow, 2006).

While some militaries do not have explicit formal doctrine, these guidelines are more frequently being developed and promoted among militaries. This has been due, at least in part, to the need to retain political control of militaries when operating out of country. Where these doctrines conflict between nations, serious challenges are presented to commanders in negotiating and coordinating collaborative efforts. The source of these differences can be due to basic national and cultural influences. Furthermore, while military doctrine should be an evolving set of ideas designed to help commanders and troops respond to changing situations, it may be the case that while some nations actively review and reassess their military doctrine, others do not. When not actively reviewed, doctrine can stagnate and become an unchanging and unchangeable set of rules and regulations (Drew & Snow, 2006). However, in the fast-paced operations of today what is needed is doctrine that is “specific enough to be useful in a particular case, yet adaptable to a wide range of possible operations” (Ryan, 2000, p. 124).

In operations involving a number of national contingents, there may then be a need to develop a joint or multinational doctrine: an agreed upon set of rules that can work within each nation’s own specified doctrine. This, however, is much easier said than done. As Marshall et al. point out, “military doctrine is embedded in the ethos, traditions, heritage and national roles of the various armies of the world. Because of this, common doctrine is not achievable in the short term” (1997, p. 17).

What can be accomplished, however, is the development of protocols and common procedures. As Canna points out, “Over extended periods ... Doctrine, standardization and political consensus characterize alliances” (2004, p. 3). Common procedures become all the more important given the fact that much of the expressed military doctrine is encapsulated in specific terms not readily understandable to other nations. In Somalia, language and cultural differences meant that “US doctrinal terms were not universally accepted or understood” (Marshall et al., 1997, p. 71). Over time, with continued interaction, doctrinal differences can be moderated, mutual understanding can be developed and working relationships can be built.

Not only does the US military have a well-developed doctrine covering operations, but since 1999 the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US have elaborated on a Joint Doctrine. This specifies the roles, obligations, duties and rights of US commanders and troops in multinational operations where US forces will be working alongside others both as leaders and followers. Such a comprehensive set of doctrinal statements has also been produced by Australia and other nations. The four nations of the ABCA (America, Britain, Canada and Australia) organization have also developed some common understandings, approaching common doctrine (ABCA, 2001).

One area of doctrine that has been highlighted by commanders in the field as of pivotal importance is the Rules of Engagement (ROE) (see Canna, 2004, p. 28; Maillet, 1998, p. 10). It is in this area in particular that national political interests directly intervene in the conduct of international deployments:

ROE are directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force or actions may or may not be applied....The commander needs to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies. (ABCA, 2001, p. 1-19)

For military personnel, the need to have ROE that suit the situation is of paramount importance. However, national differences in the definition of a given situation, political considerations, and other factors often contrive to make for a confusing array of ROE. In coordinating efforts of a multinational operation, such disarray can impose serious problems and issues of safety. However, even at the national level, contingents find their ROE changed. Commenting on an experience in Bosnia, one senior Canadian officer complained that ROEs were changed by Canada, making it impossible to deploy that contingent on operations which would involve shooting (Maillet, 1998). "Just such an operation occurred and I was faced with removing the contingent and replacing it with another nation" (Maillet, 1998, p. 10).

In another reported incident, soldiers disobeyed ROE which limited their ability to offer protection to translators (Maillet, 1998). These troops found that ethically they could not adhere to the rules that subsequently were changed to better reflect their values and beliefs.

An inherent problem with the development of a common coalition ROE is that some militaries view these prescriptively or in a restrictive way while others view them descriptively or in a permissive way (Womack, 1996). The US and other Western nations tend to adhere to the latter interpretation. However, for many other militaries, and it has been argued for UN mandated missions, military contingents must operate within defined limits and cannot change the set parameters without reference back to the central agency (Womack, 1996). Some national contingents also operate in this way even when the operational tempo is increased and decisions must be made in a hurry. This has undoubtedly led to friction between coalition partners, as in Somalia (Ryan, 2000).

Increasingly in both peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, military commanders have become more cognizant of the need to ensure smooth relations between the military and civilians directly or indirectly involved in operations. The fact that the initial decision to participate or not in a given mission is one determined by politicians, who in most cases are sensitive to public opinion, means that commanders must be concerned with civil-military relations to a degree that has certainly not been the case in the past. Not only must forces deal with the local civilian population and do so in a way that militaries have not done in the past, they must also deal with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media. This engagement with civilians has been considered within the category of civil-military co-operation (CIMIC):

CIMIC is the relationship of interaction, cooperation, and coordination, mutual support, joint planning, and constant exchange of information at all levels between military forces, civilian organizations, agencies, and intertheater civil influences needed to achieve an effective response in the full range of operations. (ABCA, 2001, pp. 9-10)

In today's multinational interventions, it is becoming harder to say where the military mission ends and the humanitarian mission begins. For this reason, militaries are as likely now to be trying to win the peace as they are to win the war. What that has meant in real terms is that contingents must now engage in rebuilding economies, ensuring conditions for the development of new political and social structures, and become involved with local populations to win hearts and minds.

Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, for instance, are currently working with other national contingents to militarily defeat the Taliban. To this end they have engaged in traditional warfare, identifying and

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neutralizing enemy positions and strongholds. However, they have also been active members in the reconstruction efforts in Kandahar province, assisting the provincial government in establishing democratic structures and processes. This element of the Canadian Forces involvement is viewed as part of a more wholistic approach to resolving conflict and aiding peacekeeping (Capstick, 2006).

Fulfilling a peacemaking role, military contingents have now begun to interact with, and in some instances rely on, an ever increasing number of NGOs to help accomplish mission objectives. Winslow (2000) reports that in 1989 there were 48 international NGOs registered with the UN; by 1998 this figure had risen to 1500. Similarly, Ryan observes, “At least 65 identifiable organizations were active in East Timor during INTERFET’s [International Force for East Timor] command of which 23 were UN agencies. This was an almost manageable number: at one stage in Rwanda 134 were counted” (2000, p. 108).

The interaction between NGOs and the military has not always gone smoothly. Winslow (2000) identifies five areas that have given rise to tension: organizational culture, tasks and ways of accomplishing them, definitions of success, ability to exert influence, and control of resources. Perhaps the key differentiator and source of tension between NGOs and the military is the very different culture prevalent in both organizational types. Among other things NGOs tend to have flatter, more decentralized structures. Their *raison d’être* is the alleviation of suffering through community involvement and reconstruction. Militaries, on the other hand, are typically seen by others in a theater of operations as there to wage war, which certainly was their primary or only role in the past. Their engagement with locals tended to be at best superficial and fleeting, often one of avoidance rather than contact. While this has changed due to the nature of changing operations, the organizational cultural factors such as beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that came with this former type of interaction may still persist within some militaries (Winslow, 2000).

Traditional stereotypes and views take a long time to change. This has certainly been the case with those prevalent among militaries concerning NGOs and vice versa. As Winslow reports, some NGO representatives interviewed saw the military as “Boys with toys, rigid, authoritarian, conservative, impatient, arrogant, civilian phobic, homophobic, and excessively security conscious” (2000, p. 222). As part of another study, the same author notes that in interviewing battalion commanders, the view of NGOs was equally unflattering. In this case, they saw these organizations as “Children of the 60s, flaky do-gooders, permissive, unpunctual, obstructionist, anarchic, undisciplined, self-righteous, and anti-military” (Winslow, 2000, p. 222). Added to these observations, the ABCA Coalition Handbook (2001) identifies other common perceptions including the military’s view that NGOs cannot speak with one voice and lack discipline. These groups in turn may view the military as politically compromised and lacking in understanding of the local cultural context (see ABCA, 2001, pp. 9-15).

As mentioned, the traditional mandate of NGOs in war torn areas has been reconstruction and the alleviation of suffering. To accomplish these goals they have established their own procedures and processes. The military’s primary mission in such areas is still one of waging war or securing peace, a somewhat different mission. Even when seeking to achieve similar ends to those of NGOs, the military will use different mechanisms and strategies, which may be at odds with those employed by NGOs. Previously mentioned organizational culture differences will certainly only heighten the likelihood that tensions will occur.

As Winslow (2000) points out, the different missions of NGOs and military contingents may mean that they define success in different ways. For NGOs who are in the field for the long haul, the goal is to eradicate all suffering and re-establish a fully functioning economy and polity. For the military, even when involved in reconstruction, goals tend to be more short-term. NGOs may view this as a lack of commitment and see the military intervention as inadequate.

In areas of conflict, resources are frequently scarce. One major point of contention between military contingents and NGOs working in such areas is the competition that may arise over access to these

resources. To fulfil their missions both parties require a wide range of local expertise, from translators to trades people, as well as materials, food, and a host of other necessities which may not be in great abundance. Competition for these goods and services can cause prices to skyrocket and cause friction between the two groups (Winslow, 2000).

One way in which NGOs secure funding is through a direct appeal to their compatriots. In developing strategies for ensuring political and financial support, they have mastered the ability to work the political system and have often achieved significant power. NGOs can exert influence over public opinion. Such is not the case for the military which may find itself nationally and internationally presented in a bad light by NGOs with which there has been conflict. This in turn only exacerbates the existing mistrust.

Despite such prevalent negative opinions of each other and many points of potential conflict, NGOs and multinational forces have increasingly begun to work together and achieve marked success. This may be due, in part, to the fact that both military and NGOs in these areas of conflict share similar problems and experiences (ABCA, 2001). These include, “working in an environment with limited direction; operating in a crowded theater; making difficult moral choices; experiencing frustration over their inability to fix problems; concern for personal safety; and competing for local resources” (ABCA, 2001, pp. 9-15).

The relationship between the media and military missions has always been fraught with tension. What the media may see as the right to know, the military may view as prying into security matters. The obvious political power of the media and its ability to affect military missions can also put the press into conflict with the military. In recent years, media representatives have been embedded with military contingents in theater, partly in an attempt to allow them to better understand the military viewpoint. However, this has not stopped the media from reporting on things that the military would prefer not to have broadcast at home. At the same time, the military recognizes the need to ensure that the media report success stories to secure public support for the mission and relay back to their host nation their needs and viewpoint. The ABCA Coalition Handbook further specifies that Public Affairs helps “protect soldiers from propaganda; support open reporting; establish confidence in the coalition; and provide balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information” (2001, pp. 15-2).

## **2.4 CONCLUSION**

Multinational operations are complex and sensitive. The bringing together of people from a wide range of nations and cultural backgrounds to achieve a common goal is fraught with many dangers and pitfalls. Not only must commanders understand the cultural differences between contingents, this cultural sensitivity has to go deeper and be fully embraced by all members of a contingent. The fact that troops from the varying nations work side by side, and may even take orders from officers belonging to other contingents, makes it even more critical to the success of the operation that military personnel be cognizant of the differences in beliefs, values and attitudes of other allied personnel.

The same process that may be involved in raising cultural awareness among troops can also assist in combating harmful, preconceived stereotypes. Working alongside personnel from other countries, often in dangerous situations, means that troops in multinational coalitions must be able to trust each other. Frequently national or racial stereotypes can hinder the building of such trust. Preconceived notions that people from one nation are lazy, drunk, or unethical can seriously endanger the mission and the lives of deployed personnel and the local population whom they are seeking to protect.

For commanders, the need to treat people equitably is made more difficult when individual national contingents have their own culturally determined codes of conduct and rewards and punishments. Comparing situations across deployed forces may exacerbate tensions between groups, create dissatisfaction among some contingents, and perhaps lead to issues that may undermine mission

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effectiveness. Such experiences may also influence the decision of those who have been deployed as to whether to remain in the forces or leave on return to their homelands. The impact of cultural issues relating to multinational operations, therefore, can go beyond the deployment itself and affect retention and recruitment of new personnel.

Indigenous populations in the areas of conflict can belong to cultural groups that are unfamiliar to troops from international coalitions. The need for cultural sensitivity among peacekeepers and peacemakers is all the more critical if they are to become part of the solution rather than part of the problem. This is even more important for those situations where members of a contingent belong to ethnic groups that are similar or sympathetic to one or more of the indigenous populations and so may not be seen as impartial.

It would appear that in some circumstances, the greater the frequency of interaction between contingents and militaries from different backgrounds, the greater the likelihood that relationships will develop fostering trust and confidence between personnel (Gareis et al., 2003). Multinational training operations can play a useful role in identifying possible problematic areas, highlighting cultural difficulties, and pointing to possible solutions that can be used in the field. Such operations can be costly and difficult to organize given the constraints and demands on most militaries. However, the net result can be smoother operations that achieve successful outcomes and create greater group cohesion. The impact of a successful operation on the increased propensity of militaries to engage in future operations would also appear to be a benefit of such pre-deployment preparations.

Generating greater cultural sensitivity can take time. However, exposing people to possible problem areas and simply raising awareness can cause people to think twice before acting in a way that others might find offensive. Many contingents now receive cultural sensitivity training prior to deployment. However, as Winslow (1999) shows, some Canadians complained of a lack of any thorough training prior to their deployment in Kosovo. As one respondent put it, “we need cross-cultural awareness ... in relation to the mission area. Sadly, most Canadians are ignorant and make mistakes because of lack of ‘soft’ knowledge” (Winslow, 1999, p. 14).

The Pearson School of Peacekeeping in Canada has begun to offer officer training in cultural sensitivity that goes beyond superficial or rudimentary knowledge and seeks to raise the knowledge level for adaptation to all possible operational settings. Some similar training is provided in the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany. Such training can only assist in the development of more cohesive, operationally effective multinational operations in the years to come.

It is also through this type of joint or multinational training that partners in coalitions can achieve better understanding of each other’s military doctrine and rules of engagement. Furthermore, given the increasing scope of missions and the closer involvement of civilian NGOs, government officials, and others security partners, it may prove useful to extend such training to these other important actors in international deployments.

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