

## TR-HFM-140 OVERVIEW

The NATO RTG-140 report begins with a focus on radicalization looking first at the work of author **David R. Mandel (CANADA)** who examines the role of instigators in promulgating terrorism. Mandel points out that instigators are rarely studied but important actors because unlike the terrorists they urge into action, they are non-interchangeable actors. Likewise while they often do not enact violence themselves, they are important catalysts for violence that are poorly understood and understudied. Instigators, according to Mandel, legitimize collective violence giving moral authority to individuals to participate directly in collective violence, and they also often shape bystanders' reactions to these events and establish the social parameters for depersonalization and stigma.

**Yoram Schweitzer (ISRAEL)** examines new developments in al Qaeda following the shift of al Qaeda operatives from Iraq to Pakistan and Afghanistan. He details the top leadership capabilities, goals and affiliate organizations as they relate to current trends. He points out that the central leadership of al Qaeda while weakened continues to lead often by staging mass propaganda hits that serve as models for its loosely affiliated off-shoot organizations. Schweitzer details how al Qaeda makes use of weak states for sheltering its activities and training activities. He also discusses the intentions of al Qaeda toward Israel and the effects of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza on boosting anti-Israeli propaganda.

**Bruce Hoffman (UNITED STATES)** argues against the "leaderless jihad" viewpoint of al Qaeda and its affiliates pointing out that the recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai were planned, premeditated, and executed by trained people operating under command and control and using sophisticated weapons and tactics in an extremely effective manner – thus, this event had all the fingerprints of an existing mature, capable organization with training camps, a headquarters, and leadership to plan and direct the operation, knowledge of surveillance tradecraft, and members with the ability to repel determined counterattacks, namely al Qaeda. He acknowledges that there are existing threats from home-grown terrorist groups (and mentions the foiled attacks in the Bronx and Fort Dix, New Jersey as examples), but emphasizes that the most consequential current threat is from an established terrorist organization with strong leadership; that is, al Qaeda.

**Brynjar Lia (NORWAY)** argues for three main reasons why al Qaeda continues to be popular around the world and continue to gain membership and support. He explains how the simple narrative of al Qaeda resonates strongly with deeply held grievances in the Muslim world and how al Qaeda has created for itself a powerful and captivating image. That it is seen as the most feared terrorist organization also according to Lia, exerts an immense attraction on young people. In some countries in Europe, Lia argues, it has become "cool" to be a jihadi. Likewise not being nationalistic in focus al Qaeda thrives because it is open for virtually everyone, irrespective of ethnicity and nationality. As long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology, anyone can in principle become an al Qaeda member. Lia also outlines the weaknesses of al Qaeda which include the difficulty in justifying killing civilians, schisms among the leadership, and its unwillingness to prepare for a transition into a political movement that does not engage in terrorism.

**Reuven Paz (ISRAEL)** argues that the Internet has become the Open University for Militant Jihadi Studies and quotes one of the militant jihadis as writing "This is a non-central university, with no geographic borders, which has its presence everywhere and each person zealous for his religion and Nation can join it... This university has its own presidency, whose role is to incite, guide, indoctrinate, and encourage the awareness of the Mujahidin. Its presidency is the leadership of the Mujahidin headed by Osama bin Laden... The university includes several faculties, among them electronic militant jihad, martyrdom, and the technology of side bombs and car bombs." Paz states that the for the credibility of information obtained from open Internet sources run by such groups is high and that study of their sources can yield an extremely wide range of information. This is because such groups are on the run, function as fugitives and are repressed in their own societies and thus have no other forum for openly recruiting and indoctrinating members. Likewise

many of their Internet forums reveal what the current debates and arguments among leaders are as well as doubts and motivations for those who follow. The difficulties in studying these open source materials include that most of the high level debate takes place in Arabic and the groups are highly fluid and adapting constantly to current counter-terrorism trends and events requiring that one immerse oneself in a thorough study of their history and current status.

**Laila Bokhari (NORWAY)** details the multi-faceted and troubled situation in Pakistan emphasizing the interaction of religion with military and state institutions that have in some contexts supported groups and ideologies that are now threatening national stability. She describes extremist groups and leaders vying for power and Islamic legitimacy among the radicalized pockets of the population that they influence. She outlines the complex interactions between these groups which alternately compete and also come together in a cooperative way that makes them a credible threat to the central state authority of Pakistan.

**Robert Lambert and Jonathan Githens-Mazer (UNITED KINGDOM)** outline some of the similarities between those who carried out and supported the 7/7 bombings and the Provisional IRA movement which also attacked London commuters pointing out how the key motivators for each group appears to be grievance and shame. The authors state that in the decade preceding 7/7 bin Laden's brand of propaganda had become common coinage for a number of Muslims throughout the UK, most notably Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Abdullah el Faisal. These instigators all became prominent local propagandists who effectively pre-figured the al Qaeda message but argued the same message – that political grievance and the shame of defeat are assuaged in an act of reciprocal violence. The authors argue that UK Muslims have a high level of frustration about a lack of any effective response to state violence against Muslims and that this parallels frustrations in the past over the tough government response to Provisional IRA terrorist prisoners' demands for political status, and in the latter case this was turned into a successful recruitment strategy by the Provisional IRA. Likewise the authors argue that one of al Qaeda's aims was that Mohammed Sadiqqi Khan, the eldest 7/7 bomber, should achieve the same heroic status as Bobby Sands and for the same purpose. According to the authors, both the Provisional IRA and al Qaeda illustrate how a weaker party in asymmetrical conflict might adopt terrorist tactics so as to balance asymmetry by making enemy civilians suffer as much as those in whose name the terrorist group claims to act.

**Siraat (UNITED KINGDOM)** is a Muslim community action and research team in Europe that is working to prevent and counter violent extremist thought and action. The authors argue that Salafism is often blamed as the ideological basis of the global militant jihad but that this is incorrect. They argue that the *Salafī* methodology is actually protective for Muslim believers against joining groups that espouse takfīri ideologies (i.e., declare other Muslims as infidels and able to be killed) and those that promulgate militant jihadi terrorism (i.e., suicide terrorist operations, terrorist beheadings, bombings, assassinations, killing civilians). The authors argue that ironically those who follow the Salafī teachings which return to the understanding of Islam as the early generation understood and practiced it are less likely to be recruited or engage in terrorist groups than are converts or those who are moderate Muslims with a poor understanding of their faith. The authors argue that strict Salafis do not pledge allegiance to other groups or leaders and are prohibited from rebelling against the leader of a Muslim country regardless of how unjust and oppressive that leader is, and especially if the Muslims do not have the ability to remove a particular leader from power. Salafis are supposed to take into account the benefits and harms of any action which is done in the name of advancing the religion and do not endorse harming other Muslims nor creating chaos. Salafis do not agree with the targeting of civilians and non-combatants in warfare based on the evidences from the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The confusion arises between mainstream Salafis and the militant *jihadī-takfīrī* extremist narrative that has adopted established Islamic lexicology and terminology in an attempt to promote itself as being the most authentic and correct interpretation of the religion. As a result, in order to gain legitimacy to these claims, such violent extremist narrative ascribes itself to Salafism. This is why we find references to the 'Salaf' (the righteous predecessors) and 'Salafī' (one who takes his example these early righteous generations) replete within the discourse of Abū Qatāda, Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī, Abū Mus'ab as-Sūrī, Ayman adh-Dhawāhirī and many others.

This is however incorrect and the Salafi scholars answer their militant jihadi claims asserting that they are incorrect in their interpretations of jihad and in claiming Salafi Islam as the foundation for their terrorist beliefs and actions.

**Albert Jongman (NETHERLANDS)** provides a comprehensive look at radicalization, counter radicalization, and deradicalization inside the Netherlands, detailing how recent events, including several assassinations, have heightened tensions with Muslim immigrant descent segments of the population. Tensions and intolerance were in clear evidence in the 2006 elections with immigrants descent populations clearly pitted against right wing anti-immigrant groups which gave rise to campaigns to focus on youth and radicalisation. The Dutch government also increased Internet surveillance for awareness and early warning of potential attacks. The arrest and trial of members of the Hofstad group, a home-grown terrorist group foiled when a member assassinated a controversial filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, resulted in a number of changes to anti-terrorism legislation, including redefinition of crimes (including membership in a terrorist group) and criminals (including supporters/financiers of terrorism) and judicial, law enforcement, legislative, and intelligence reforms that focus on pre-emption and anticipation versus reaction. The view of the Dutch government is that a holistic approach is warranted for terrorism, one that deals with the underlying grievance causing the violence (e.g., poverty, alienation, marginalization, and segregation) – a hard-learned lesson from violence events in the 1970s related to grievances held by the Moroccan immigrant community. This approach is based on a more nuanced understanding of radicalization and is broader than simply regarding terrorism as a law enforcement problem – resulting in new ways of counterterrorism coordination and cooperation within the Netherlands. Their strategy is to focus on prevention of radicalization in Muslim youths and abolishing – hotspots to accomplish three goals: prevent attacks, be adequately prepared for a large attack, and pay attention to the causes of terrorism. Some policies, like restrictive immigration and asylum policies have unintended consequences: more illegal immigrants. The four cities in which the majority of Muslims live, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht, all have tailored initiatives to improve relationships between groups and deal with socio-economic problems and counter segregation. Jongman explains that the government uses national surveys assessing the level of fear of terrorism and feeling of security and reduction in social problems in urban problem areas (including school dropout and poverty rates, rates of dependence on social security, segregation levels, and crime) to assess the efficacy of their counterterrorism efforts. Current challenges include the lack of integration of African first and second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands (especially Somalis, who he states are clannish and tend to be more lonely/alienated), the Moroccan community (who he states are responsible for majority of crime and violence problems), and the threats made by al Qaeda of retaliatory attacks in the Netherlands for their involvement in the Afghanistan conflict.

**Anne Speckhard (UNITED STATES)** argues that there is a lethal cocktail of terrorism made up of the terrorist group, individual, ideology and social support, and that individuals may have their own vulnerabilities and motivations for becoming terrorists that mesh with the groups motivations and are supported by its ideology and made easier by the degree of social support which it enjoys within the community. She states that motivations for terrorism in conflict zones is usually trauma and revenge driven whereas in non-conflict zones it's much more mediated by issues of marginalization, frustrated aspirations, discrimination, desire to belong, thirst for heroism, etc. She argues however that militant jihad groups are adept at bringing images and stories from the conflict zones into non-conflict zones and capitalize on the strong emotional responses and even secondary traumatization that occurs by showing potential recruits such images. Speckhard goes on to outline disengagement and deradicalization programs that can occur in militaries, prisons, community settings and over the Internet. She details many of the prison programs that are currently in existence and writes about her own involvement in designing and pilot testing the detainee rehabilitation program which was put into effect for over 20,000 detainees held by US forces in Iraq. She states that this was the first program to intensively use a psychological intervention coupled with Islamic challenge which is usually the predominant aspect of other programs and argues for the reasons why psychological treatment is also a necessary component to reverse ideological indoctrination and address the original vulnerabilities that first drew the individual to the terrorist group and its ideology.

**Sherifa Zuhur (UNITED STATES)** argues that ideology is of extreme importance in understanding Islamic radicalization and those who become radicalized into militant jihadi terrorism. Extremists call for a restoration of God’s sovereignty, and thus their movement is one of purist reform. Zuhur states that while there are many ideological differences among groups and regions that the “new militant jihad” sees Muslims embroiled in a global conflict, the ‘New Jihad’ has correctly identified local Muslim governments as being influenced, and subservient to Western powers. These groups, according to Zuhur, believe these rulers to have acted against Islam, in their national programs, actions such as the peace treaties with Israel (for Egypt and Jordan), by promoting legal reforms not in accord with *shari`ah*, or because of their corruption. Prejudices stirred up by ignorant or intolerant figures are difficult to dispel where people have little or no contact with the other groups, and when it is reasonable for them to believe that Israel oppresses Palestinians, or that Western Christians hate Muslims. *Takfir*, which she defines as the action of calling a Muslim an infidel, or non-believer and as such he may be the object of jihad; i.e., he may be killed for offenses to Islam. Most of the ‘new jihads’ identify the local Muslim governments as made up of apostates through the process of takfir, thus legitimizing violence on these authorities and their police, judges, or other agents. The secularization of assimilated Muslims is unlikely according to Zuhur who states that the “Islamic world” is so impacted by Islamic revival and devoid of counter-ideologies. Likewise she argues that it is a mistake for policymakers to grant too much importance to government supported religious figures in the hopes that they will influence those who might be attracted to extremist ideology, as they are often discounted by those drawn to militant jihadi groups. The most effective speakers in this process, according to Zuhur are those who have been part of movements and recanted as opposed to governmental *‘ulama* (clerics).

**Laurie Fenstermacher (UNITED STATES)** gives a holistic model for understanding radicalization into terrorism and outlines the factors involved. She lays out the essential components, the environments in which terrorism emerges and the factors which trigger radicalization so as to increase susceptibility to recruitment and group mobilization and goes on to outline the prevailing theories related to all of these factors. Any model of radicalization must according to Fenstermacher consider at a minimum, the group, the individual actors, their motivations and goals, the supporters, and environmental factors and ideology which ties all of these together. Fenstermacher finishes her paper with an elegant discussion of various models as they apply to this area of study.

**David R. Mandel (CANADA)** discusses the signal value of the terrorist threat and what it portends for the future. Stating that the statistical risk of terrorism in the U.S. is comparable to that of being killed by lightning or an allergic reaction to peanuts, concern about terrorism as a form of threat, both by government officials and members of the public, reflects, according to Mandel much about its psychosocial nature. The threat of terrorism, unlike the threat of lightning, seems to stem in large measure from the signal it sends, and from our own ability to imagine terrorists increasing the frequency and magnitude of their mayhem unless counter-terrorism measures are taken to stop them. Mandel argues that there is reason to hypothesize that perceived risk or threat might be amplified by feelings of fear and attenuated by feelings of anger and gives experimental evidence to support these hypotheses.

**Anne Speckhard (UNITED STATES)** sets out a model for psycho-social resilience to terrorism identifying and discussing the variables that impact resilience, stating that the concept of resilience implies adaptability and a certain ability to “bounce back” in the face of a challenge or stressor. In this model resilience is likewise defined as dynamic variable, one that is influence by many co-variates and that exists on a continuum of adaptability. To be resilient an individual or society must in the face of a challenge, retain flexibility, adaptability, functionality and empathy. To lose any of these is to lose resilience. Conversely for these traits to be present, or even to develop or to increase in the face of a stressor is to show positive resilience. Likewise, a loss of resilience is indicated by the appearance of pathological symptoms: of posttraumatic stress (including flashbacks, high arousal states, loss of concentration, irritability, etc.), dissociation (a separation of normal cognitive functions, emotional numbing, inability to think, etc.), anxiety, depression, and panic, all of which interfere with and create a loss of normal functioning and/or an increase in xenophobia. According to this

model the variables that affect resilience to terrorism on both a societal and individual level include ten main variables which both affect resilience to a stressor, and may also be affected in turn by a traumatic stressor event. These ten variables are each discussed with implications for governments to consider steps for promoting and enhancing resilience to terrorism.

**Tayseer Elias Shawash (JORDAN) and Anne Speckhard (UNITED STATES)** discuss the 2005 al Qaeda attacks in Jordan and analyze the results of research by Dr. Shawash following the attacks on the resilience of those affected studying two groups: civilians and emergency work force that assisted in the attacks. In addition to the loss of family members by death, economic, educational and health losses were all significant for the victims of these attacks. Posttraumatic and generalized anxiety responses, as well as somatization were common although they diminished for many over time. Civilians generally did worse than the emergency workers, although both groups suffered. In Jordanian society, friends, family, community and religion all played important roles in bolstering resilience. Traumatized victims who were in clear need of psychotherapy often refused treatment due to issues of stigmatization in Jordanian culture. Jordanian government officials played an important role in helping victims, setting up charities for them, and in responding with an increase in security at public events.

**Anne Speckhard (UNITED STATES), Gino Verleye (BELGIUM) and Beatrice Jacuch (POLAND)** present analysis of an exploratory study of resilience of civilian and military personnel working a high threat environment (Iraq). The model of resilience presented in a previous chapter was tested in this study as well as the ability to conduct a survey on resilience to a high threat environment remotely through the Internet. The researchers found ample evidence of posttraumatic and acute stress responses in this sample, although these diminished over time. Even one month past the event, twenty-one percent of the respondents evidenced thoughts of the traumatic event intruding in their minds. In regard to the traumatic event(s) twenty-six percent of the sample said they tried not to think about it; twenty-seven percent avoided talking about it; and twenty-one percent avoided reminders of it. Twenty-one percent felt unease and uncertainty about the future in response to the event. Thirty percent of the sample said their sleep patterns were disturbed in response to the event; fifteen percent had trouble concentrating; thirty percent were jumpy or easily startled; and nineteen percent were easily agitated or angered in the months enduring beyond one month following exposure to the traumatic event. Additional posttraumatic responses were reported by the sample with the most reported symptom being fear that it could happen again; reported by fifty-seven percent of the sample in the first month after exposure, with that diminishing to twenty percent beyond one month after exposure. Psychosomatic symptoms included more than normal fatigue (thirty-eight percent diminishing to twenty three percent); stomach distress or nausea (twenty one diminishing to ten percent); general aches in the body (fifteen diminishing to eight percent); headaches (twelve diminishing to nine percent) dizziness or difficulty breathing (six diminishing to four percent); and panic attacks (seven diminishing to three percent). Becoming fearless was endorsed by twenty-nine percent of the sample in the first month after exposure diminishing to twenty-five percent of the sample in the months following. Likewise twenty percent of the respondents said they became excited by danger and sought it out more following the exposure in the first month with this diminishing to seventeen percent for the months following beyond one month. Coping mechanisms were also explored and it was noted that many of the respondent would have liked a professional intervention to help them cope with their distress.

